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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
One aspect of the case offers a field for future litigation, and de-
mands an investigation of the North Carolina Constitution22 and of
pertinent state statutes. 2  The principal case holds that the state cannot
exclude individuals, because of their faith or lack of it, from receiving
the benefits of public welfare legislation.24 Some of the court's language
indicates it will consider legislation to transport school children as pub-
lic welfare legislation.2 5  Yet the court declares that it does not mean
to intimate that a state cannot provide transportation only to children
attending public schools.2 6  It is possible that this question will be left
to the state's discretion and if the state does transport private school
children no one can be heard to complain. Nor can anyone complain if
transportation is not furnished. However, if a state provides trans-
portation for public school children, as is done in many states, the legis-
lature having determined that expenditures therefor fill a public need,
it is at least doubtful, under the present holding, whether the state may
discriminate against children attending non-profit private schools, with-
out encroaching upon the equal privileges guaranteed to all under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
MILES J. MCCORMICK.
Courts-Jury-Exclusion of Women from the Jury List
In Ballard v. United States,' a mother and son were convicted in
the Federal District Court in the Southern District of California for
to the state educational system, then it logically follows that . . their [the chil-
dren's] transportation to and from such schools could be paid ... " Cochrane v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Ed., 281 U. S. 370, 372 (1930).
2' N. C. CoNsT. Art. IX, §1: "Religion, morality, and knowledge being neces-
sary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of
education shall forever be encouraged." Art. IX, §4: "The proceeds . . . shall be
faithfully appropriated for establishing and maintaining in this state a system of
free public schools, and for no other uses and purposes whatsoever." Art. IX,
§11: "The General Assembly is hereby empowered to enact that every child ...
shall attend the public schools ... unless educated by other means."
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §115-302: "Every parent, guardian or other person
in the state having charge or control of a child between the ages of seven and
sixteen, shall cause such child to attend school .... The term 'school' as used
in this section is defined to embrace all public schools and such private schools as
have tutors or teachers and curricula that are approved by the superintendent of
public instruction or the State Board of Education." §115-374: "The control and
management of all facilities for the transportation of public school children shall
be vested in the State of North Carolina under the direction and supervision of
the State Board of Education. . . The tax levying authorities in the various
counties of the state are authorized and empowered to provide in the capital outlay
budget adequate buildings and equipment for the storage of all school busses. .
The use of school busses shall be limited to the transportation of children to and
from school for the regularly organized school day."
2 Everson v. Ewing Township, - U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 512, 91 L.
ed. (Adv. Ops.) 472, 480 (1947).
U. S. - 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 513, 91 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 472, 481.
- U. S. ., 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 513, 91 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 472, 481.
U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 512, 91 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 472, 480.
- U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 261, 91 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 195 (1946).
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promoting a fraudulent religious organization through the use of the
mails. The defendants moved to quash the indictment and also chal-
lenged the array of petit jurors on the ground that women, who are
eligible for jury duty in California, 2 had been "intentionally and sytem-
atically" excluded from the panel. Both motions were denied. The
United States Supreme Court in reversing the Circuit Court of Appeals,
which had affirmed the rulings of the trial court; held, the indictment
must be dismissed because the "purposeful and systematic" exclusion of
women from the panel was a departure from the scheme of jury selec-
tion which Congress had adopted.3
Generally, the qualifications and exemptions of federal jurors are to
be determined by the laws of the state in which the federal court is
located.4  Congress has specifically provided that citizens will not be
disqualified as grand and petit jurors in any court of the United States
because of race, color, previous conditions of servitude5 or party affilia-
tion.6 But there is no federal statute which guarantees women a right
to serve on a federal jury. Neither the Fourteenth 7 nor the Nineteenth
Amendment 8 to the Constitution of the United States requires the states
to place women on jury lists. On the other hand, the Sixth Amend-
2 CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Deering, 1941) §198.
*A five to four decision. This case had previously been before the Supreme
Court of the United States on a different issue. Ballard v. United States, 322
U. S. 78 (1944).
T.he result in the instant case is not surprising in view of the dictum in Glasser
v. United States, 315 U. S 60 (1941). The court in that decision strongly indi-
cated that it would have held the jury illegally constituted had there not been such
a short time since the state law making women eligible for jury duty had come
into force. United States v. Roemig, 52 F. Supp. 857 (N. D. Iowa 1943) followed
the dictum in Glasser v. United States and sustained a motion to quash an indict-
ment because women, although eligible for jury duty in Iowa, had been system-
atically excluded from the jury. In Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., - U. S. ,
66 Sup. Ct. 984, 90 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 922 (1946) petitioner's motion to strike
out the jury panel because "day laborers" had been excluded was denied by the
district court and this ruling was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals but the
Supreme Court of the United States reversed this ruling and granted a new trial.
'JUDICIAL CODE §276 (1917), 28 U. S. C. A. §412. Both grand and petit
jurors are selected by the clerk of the court and a jury commissioner from the
lists of eligible voters as determined by state law. JUDICIAL CODE §277 (1911),
28 U. S. C. A. §413.
r JUDICIAL CODE §278 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §415.
'JUDICIAL. CODE §276 (1917), 28 U. S. C. A. §412.
T U. S. v. Roemig, 52 F. Supp. 857 (N. D. Iowa 1943) ; see Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 310 (1880). Miller, The Woman Juror (1922) 2 ORE.
L. Rav. 30, 32.
It is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States for states to exclude Negroes from jury lists because of race, color
or previous condition of servitude. Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 (1941) ; Carter v.
Texas, 177 U. S. 442 (1900). Excluding members of the Catholic faith from a
grand jury was held to be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Juarez v.
State, 102 Tex. Crim. Rep. 297, 277 S. W. 1091 (1925).
' United States v. Ballard, 35 F. Supp. 105 (S. D. Calif. 1940) ; Hall v. State,
136 Fla. 644, 187 So. 392 (1939); Powers v. State, 172 Ga. 1, 157 S. E. 195
(1931); Browning v. State, 120 Ohio St. 62, 165 N. E. 566 (1929); State v.
Emery, 224 N. C. 581, 31 S. E. (2d) 858 (1944).
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ment9 . does not prevent the states from making women liable for jury
duty. Therefore, each state is free to determine whether women are
eligible jurors or not.10 The majority of the states either permit or
require women to serve on juries, while sixteen states have not placed
this public duty on women."
After a state has determined by law those qualified to serve as
jurors, 12 the federal courts will decide whether the selection of federal
juries from the names of those qualified is proper.13 Even though no
constitutional issue is at stake, the United States Supreme Court may
exercise its power of supervision of justice in the federal courts to
prevent women from being excluded from federal juries in those states
where women are eligible jurors.14 An indictment by a grand jury or a
verdict rendered by a petit jury drawn from a panel in which a qualified
class or group has been excluded as such is subject to dismissal without
regard to whether the rights of the defendant were prejudiced.' 3
Mr. Justice Douglas speaking for the majority in Ballard v. United
States stated:
"The evil lies in the admitted exclusion of an eligible class or
group in the community in disregard of the prescribed standards
of jury selection. The systematic and intentional exclusion of
women, like the exclusion of a racial group . . . or an economic
class . .. deprives the jury system of the broad basis it was de-
signed by Congress to have in our democratic society."'1
The United States Supreme Court, however, has recognized that com-
plete representation of all eligible groups on every federal jury would
be impossible and, consequently, no such standard is required. 17 Neither
is it objectionable for a state to exempt by law particular groups because
*United States v. Wood, 299 U. S. 123 (1936), rehearing denied, 299 U. S.
624; Tynam v. United States, 297 Fed. 177 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923), certeriori denied,
266 U. S. 604 (1924). The Sixth Amendment provides in part: "No person shall
be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a present-
ment or indictment of a grand jury ... '
" Ballard v. United States, - U.S. , 67 Sup. Ct. 261, 91 L. ed. (Adv.
Ops.) 195 (1946). A state law creating an unlawful qualification is not binding in
the selection of federal jurors. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., - U. S. -, 66
Sup. Ct. 984, 90 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 922 (1946).
11 (1947) 33 A. B. A. J. 113, 114, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming.
"The majority rule is that where the primary qualification of a juror is that
he be an elector, the conferring upon women of the right of suffrage also makes
them eligible as jurors. Note (1945) 157 A. L. R. 461, 472.
" Ballard v. United States, - U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 261, 91 L. ed. (Adv.
Ops.) 195 (1946) ; Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., - U. S. - , 66 Sup. Ct. 984,
90 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 922 (1946).
' Ibid.
15 Ibid.
"- U.S. -, 67 Sup. Ct. 261, 265, 91 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 195, 199 (1946).




of competing public interests.1 s Federal courts have no authority to
interfere with state courts which permit women as an eligible group to
be systematically and intentionally excluded from the jury lists but it is
likely that the strict policy pursued by the federal courts will have a
wholesome influence on state courts.' 9
What effect will the decision in Ballard v. United States have on the
federal courts in North Carolina? In 1944 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina in State v. Emery2" held that under Article I, §13 of the state
constitution women in this state were ineligible to serve on the jury.
This decision was nullified in 1946 by the adoption of a constitutional
amendment.2 ' Article I, §§13 and 19 were changed to read as follows:
Sec. 13. Right of jury. No person shall be convicted of any crime but
by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful persons in open
court....
Sec. 19. Controversies at law respecting property. In all controversies
at law respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by jury is one of
the best securities of the rights of the people and ought to remain sacred
and inviolable. No person shall be excluded from jury service on account
of sex.
22
What effect do these changes in the North Carolina Constitution have
on the eligibility of women to serve as jurors? (1) The substitution of
"persons" for "men" in Article I, §13 removes the objection upon which
the decision in State v. Enmery was based. But it does not follow that
this change alone would require that women be included on jury lists.
(2) The effect of adding the provision "No person shall be excluded
from jury service on account of sex" to Article I, §19 is to make
women, otherwise eligible, subject to jury duty on an equal basis with
men. (3) Neither of these sections, as amended, is self-executing.
Legislation" is necessary to impose jury duty on women in criminal
"s Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U. S. 638 (1906). (1947) Session N. C. General
Assembly, H. B. No. 87 which amended N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §9-19 and ex-
empted practicing attorneys at law from jury duty.
' In 1941 a committee appointed by Chief Justice Stone recommended passage
of a federal law establishing uniform national standards for selection of jurors in
all federal courts. It was also recommended that women be eligible for federal
jury duty in all states. (1947) 33 A. B. A. J. 113.
20224 N. C. 581, 31 S. E. (2d) 858, 157 A. L. R. 441 (1944), noted in 23
N. C. L. Rsv. 152. The trial jury consisted of ten men and two women. The
regular panel had been exhausted and the two women were selected as tales jurors.
The defendant, convicted of violating the prohibition laws, was granted a new
trial.
"1 The word "persons" was substituted for "men" in Art. I, §§1, 7, 11, 13, and
26 and in Art. VI, §1. The provision "No person shall be excluded from jury
service on account of sex" was added to Art. I, §19. This amendment was certified
to the Secretary of State by the Governor December 10, 1946 and became effective
on that date. (1945) Session Laws of N. C., Chapter 634, §5.
22 N. C. CoNsT., Art. I, §§13 and 19. Italics supplied.
3 The Attorney General said that this constitutional amendment making women
subject to jury duty only established the principle and that it did not provide the
19471
338 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol.25
cases. Inasmuch as G. S. 9-1 has been apparently interpreted to be
inapplicable to women24 it would seem that this section would have to be
amended to comply with the constitutional mandate that "No person
shall be excluded from jury service on account of sex." Recent legis-
lation has been acted to accomplish each of these purposes.2 5
G. S. 9-1 was amended in 1947 to require county commissioners to
select the names of persons of sufficient intelligence and good moral
character to serve on grand and petit juries not only from the tax lists
but also from a list of names of persons who do not appear upon the
tax lists who are residents of the county and over twenty-one years of
age. The clerk of the board of county commissioners or jury commis-
sion, in making the list to lay before the board or commission, may
secure lists of persons from sources of inf6rmation deemed reliable.
The only groups excluded are those who have been adjudged to be non
compos mentis and those who have been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude.
26
The intent of the General Assembly to give women an equal oppor-
tunity with men to serve on juries27 appears to be manifested in several
1947 statutory provisions which supersede the common-law rule in
detailed laws necessary to put the principle into courtroom practice. News and
Observer (Raleigh, N. C.), March 23, 1947. Art. VI, §6 of the ARIz. CONST. pro-
yides "A trial by jury shall be drawn and summoned from the body of the
county .... " This provision was construed by the court not to be self-executing.
Subsequent legislation limiting jury service to men was ruled to be valid in Mc-
Daniels v. State, - Ariz. - , 158 P. (2d) 151 (1945). In 1945 the legislature
of Arizona changed its policy and jury service for women is now optional by
statute. AaIz. CODE (1939) (Cum. Pocket Supp. 1945), §37-102.
24 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §9-1 prior to 1947 amendments provided that the
county commissioners shall select jury lists from the "names of all such persons
as have paid all the taxes assessed against them for the preceding year. . . ." But
Chief Justice Stacy speaking for the majority in State v. Emery rejected the pro-
posal that this provision was intended to apply to women. In the course of his
opinion he said: "It were better that the controlling voice should speak again be-
fore adopting the interpretation which would impose the obligation of jury service
on all women, otherwise qualified, under the provisions of this ancient statute.
Obviously, we should think some exemptions would want to be provided, and
other changes made." State v. Emery, 224 N. C. 581, 587, 31 S. E. (2d) 858, 863,
157 A. L. R. 441, 449 (1944).
2" (1947) Session of N. C. General Assembly, S. B. No. 5: H. B. No. 87.
2 (1947) Session of N. C. General Assembly, H. B. No. 87. Prior to passage
of this bill, N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §9-1 provided that the jury lists would be
taken from persons who had paid their taxes during the preceding year. N. C.
GEN. STAT. (1943) §9-16 provided, in part, that it shall not be a valid cause of
challenge that a juror called from those whose names are drawn from the box is
not a freeholder, or has not paid the taxes assessed against him during the pre-
ceding two years. The 1947 legislation considerably increased the number of per-
sons eligible for jury duty by in effect including all persons over twenty-one
whether taxpayers or not. Persons engaged in certain specified occupations are
exempt from jury service by law. N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §9-19 as amended in
1947.
27 The following was printed on the ballot submitted to the voters November
5, 1946:
o For Amendment making Constitution equally applicable to men and women..
11 Against amendments making the Constitution applicable to men and women.
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this state that juries are not to be separated.2 8  Judges of the superior
court are now authorized, in their discretion, to permit separation of the
jury in any criminal case.29 Moreover, superior court judges are
authorized to permit members of the jury of opposite sexes to be pro-
vided separate rooming accommodations when not actually engaged in
deliberations as jurors and pending the bringing in of a verdict.30
The 1947 legislation provides that registered and practical nurses in
active practice are exempt from jury duty.3 1 When any woman is sum-
moned to serve on any regular or tales jury, she or her husband may
appear before the clerk of the superior court and certify that she de-
sires to be excused from jury service for one of the following causes:
(1) that she is ill and unable to serve; (2) that she is required to care
for her children [who may be] under twelve years of age; (3) that
some member of her family is ill and requires her presence and atten-
tion; whereupon the clerk in his discretion may excuse her from jury
service and so notify the judge of the superior court upon convening
the court.
32
These changes in the North Carolina jury laws have removed certain
practical objections to women serving on juries, and have placed them
on an equal status with men as eligible jurors. Although the provisions
for excusing women from jury duty are liberal, there is nothing in any
of these statutes which expressly or impliedly authorizes county com-
missioners intentionally and systematically to exclude women from the
jury lists.
Under the present practice of the federal courts, it is clear that after
the effective date of these statutes33 which confer upon women the
28 State v. McKenzie, 166 N. C. 290, 81 S. E. 301 (1914); State v. Perry, 44
N. C. 330 (1853) ; State v. Tilghman, 33 N. C. 513 (1850); State v. Miller, 18
N. C. 500 (1836). In criminal cases, particularly capital offenses, the common
law rule against separation of juries has been more rigidly enforced than in civil
cases. Separation in a capital case does not as a matter of law vitiate the verdict
and the judge is permitted to determine if the jurors were influenced by one
outside the jury.
Burns v. Laundry, 204 N. C. 145, 167 S. E. 573 (1933). The jury was allowed
to separate for four days but a new trial was granted because the minds of the
jurors were not refreshed on the charge when the trial was resumed.
Lerch v. McKinne, 187 N. C. 419, 122 S. E. 9 (1924) ; Lumber Co. v. Lumber
Co., 187 N. C. 417, 121 S. E. 755 (1924). The jury after rendering a verdict and
separating were allowed to reassemble on their own request and correct a clerical
error in their verdict in the absence of any showing that the jurors had been
influenced by outsiders.
29 (1947) Session of N. C. General Assembly, H. B. No. 87 which amends
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §9-17.
S. B. No. 5 which amends N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §11-11 no longer requires
the jury officer to take an oath to keep the jury together.o Ibid.
" lbid. Amends N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §9-19.
2 Ibid.
"1 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §9-1 as amended in 1947 requires boards of county
commissioners for the several counties, at their regular meetings on the first Mon-
day in June in the year 1947, to prepare jury lists and every two years thereafter.
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civic duty to service on juries, a defendant in a federal court in this
state can successfully move to quash an indictment or challenge an
array if it can be shown that women were systematically and purpose-
fully excluded from the grand or petit jury, and it will not be necessary
that he show that his rights were thereby prejudiced. However, it is
not certain that a defendant in a state court will be equally successful.
Will he have to show that the exclusion of women was prejudicial to
his rights? The Supreme Court of North Carolina has frequently held
that statutes which prescribe the manner of selecting jury lists are for
the most part "directory" only and in the absence of prejudice, fraud
or bad faith on the part of local officials,3 4 have refused to sustain a
motion to quash the indictment or to sustain a challenge to the array.
These cases, however, are not necessarily indicative of the attitude the
highest court in this state will take when the question of intentional
and systematic exclusion of women from the jury lists comes before it:
(1) Generally, these cases are concerned with those irregularities re-
sulting from a deviation from the mechanical processes prescribed by
statute for the selection of names for the jury lists 5 (2) the system-
atic exclusion of approximately half of those eligible for jury duty is a
more serious question. For instance, suppose all men are excluded
from the jury lists and only women are subject to be drawn for jury
duty in a particular county; (3) repeated instances in which the names
of only men appear on jury lists are more likely to be the result of "bad
faith" on the part of selecting officials than mere chance;30 (4) the
provision in Article I, §19 of the Constitution that "No person shall be
The same applies to counties which have jury commissioners or other legally con-
stituted body charged by law with the duty of drawing names of persons for jury
service.
The Attorney General of North Carolina advised that the best means to test
the legality of women jurors was to select women as tales jurors now. Moreover,
it would give women an opportunity to serve before jury lists were prepared in
June, 1947. News and Observer (Raleigh, N. C.), March 23, 1947. N. C. GEN.
STAT. (1943) §9-11 requires that tales jurors be freeholders.
", State v. Mallard, 184 N. C. 667, 114 S. E. 17 (1922); Lanier v. Town of
Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 93 S. E. 850 (1917); State v. Paramore, 146 N. C.
604, 60 S. E. 502 (1908) ; State v. Banner, 149 N. C. 519, 63 S. E. 84 (1908) ;
Moore v. Guano Co., 130 N. C. 229, 41 S. E. 293 (1902) ; State v. Perry, 122 N. C.
1018, 29 S. E. 384 (1898) ; State v. Durham Fertilizer Co., 111 N. C. 658, 16 S. E.
231 (1892). Note (1934) 92 A. L. R. 1109. Irregularity in drawing names for
a jury panel as ground of complaint by defendant in criminal prosecution.
11 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTnS AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3d ed. by Frank
E. Horack, Jr. 1943) 122. Although the statutes regulating the selection of juries
evince an intent to place great safeguards around their selection, minor irregulari-
ties, in the absence of fraud and where no injury is shown, are usually construed
to be substantial compliance with the statutes and reversible error is thereby
avoided.
"' A distinction must be kept in mind between exclusion from a jury list and
not being drawn for jury duty from the list. No doubt, there will be many
legitimate juries on which there are no women; and, conceivably, there will be
juries on which there are no men. People v. Manuel, 41 Cal. App. 153, 182 Pac.
306 (1919), (women convicted of forgery by an all woman jury).
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excluded from jury duty on account of sex" should operate to make
statutes passed pursuant thereto mandatory rather than "directory."
' 7
Although some state courts require the defendant to show that his
rights were prejudiced,3 8 the opposing view and the one adopted by the
Supreme Court of the United States appears to be the better one. It
is logical to conclude that, in a state where trial by jury for the most
part3 9 has meant trial by a jury of men only, one who has been tried by
a jury composed of eligible men received a "fair trial" even though
women eligible for jury duty had been intentionally excluded from the
jury lists. Nevertheless, the more important consideration is whether
or not there has been an intentional violation of the state laws by local
officials in the selection of jurors. It is submitted that, when it is shown
in a North Carolina court that women were intentionally and system-
atically excluded from the jury list, defendAnt's motion to quash the
indictment or challenge the array should be sustained.40
WILLIAM B. AycocK.
Insurance-Fidelity Bonds-Renewals as Affecting the
Liability of Surety
On July 10, 1929, the plaintiff indemnity company issued to the de-
fendant bank its fidelity bond covering any loss, not exceeding $10,000,
which defendant might sustain as a result of the defalcations of its
cashier "while in any position in the continuous employ of the employer
after 12 noon 15 July 1929 but before the employer shall become aware
of any default on the part of the employee and discovered before the
expiration of three years from the termination of such employment or
cancellation of this bond, whichever may first happen." The bond could
37 Art. I, §13 of the N. C. CoNsT. which states "No person shall be convicted
of any crime but by unanimous verdict of a jury . . ." has been construed to
guarantee to every person whether a citizen of this state or not a trial by jury
(except in petty misdemeanors). State v. Cutshall, 110 N. C. 538, 544, 15 S. E.
261. 262 (1892).
"8 People v. Parman, 14 Cal. (2d) 17, 92 P. (2d) 387 (1939) ; State v. James,
96 N. J. L. 132, 114 A. 553 (1921). Contra: Walter v. State, 208 Ind. 231, 195
N. E. 268 (1935). Noted (1935-36) 11 INn. L. J. 386.
" Mr. Justice Devin dissenting in State v. Emery stated: "In some counties
[in North Carolina] the names of qualified women are included in the jury lists.
So that if we should hold now that women were qualified to serve on the jury, it
would effect no change, but would only give added authority to a practice already
grown up." 224 N. C. 581, 591, 31 S. E. (2d) 858, 865 (1944).
o It is questionable if mandamus by a voter to require the county commissioners
to prepare a jury list without excluding women will lie inasmuch as N. C. GEN.
STAT. (1943) §9-1, as amended in 1947, gives the commissioners a certain amount
of discretion in selecting the jury list from the names of those eligible to serve.
Board of Education of Alamance County v. Board of Com'rs of Alamance
County, 178 N. C. 305, 100 S. E. 698 (1919) ; Dula v. Board of Graded School
Trustees of Lenoir, 177 N. C. 426, 99 S. E. 193 (1919) ; State ex ref. Passer v.
County Bd., 171 Minn. 177, 213 N. W. 545, 52 A. L. R. 916 (1927) (specifically
denying mandamus when women were excluded). Contra: Davis v. Arthur, 139
Ga. 74, 76 S. E. 676 (1912) (a religious group had been excluded).
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